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Abstract 
Purpose: The main objective of this paper is to examine how the customers' perceptions 
of delays and safety relate to each other and to behavioral intentions 
Design/methodology/approach: We modified a customer satisfaction questionnaire to 
include questions relating to the constructs we wanted to examine and collaborated with a 
major international airline to collect data from 797 customers through in-flight surveys. 
Findings: We obtain three key original findings. First, perceived safety exerts a direct 
positive effect on behavioral intentions. Second, perceived delays exert an indirect effect 
mediated by perceived safety. Finally, customers believe operational practices affect both 
delay and safety. 
Originality/value: This is the first paper that examines the customer's perspective on two 
of the most important aspects of airline operations management: delays and safety. Our 
findings are of great value to managers who want to evaluate the impact of delays and 
safety on customers and to researches interested in the theoretical relationships between 
these two constructs. 
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1. Introduction 
Airline punctuality and safety are important concerns for the flying public. According 
to a recent US Department of Transportation (2011) study, about 25% of all flights 
in the US were delayed in the first two months of 2011.  
Starr (2001) notes that safety has always been a critical facet of quality 
management, but that operations management needs to focus more on safety 
issues. The analysis of airline safety differs fundamentally from that of flight delays 
because the former cannot be quantified as easily. The (fortunate) rarity of fatal 
airline crashes makes direct measurement of safety difficult, forcing researchers to 
use proxies such as accident and incident rates (Raghavan & Rhoades, 2005). 
Air travel is safe in absolute terms: Barnett and Wang (1998) estimate passenger 
death risk to be about one in 8 million on First-World domestic jet flights. Yet, 
approximately 35% of Americans are afraid to fly (Miletich, 1990). Researchers 
have been arguing that airline safety expenditures should be regarded as 
investments that pay off over time through increased customer demand (Raghavan 
& Rhoades, 2005). But this will only be the case if customers perceive airlines that 
invest more in safety as being safer. 
The negative impact of delays on passenger satisfaction is well-documented (e.g., 
Ferrer, Rocha e Oliveira & Parasuraman, 2012). Abdelghany, Shah, Sidhartha and 
Abdelghany (2004) found that punctuality is a key factor in the attraction of new 
customers and the retention of current ones. However, the extent to which 
expected delays affect a customer's choice of airline is not as clear, as customers 
rarely have access to relevant information (such as which of the alternative flights 
they can take is less likely to be delayed) at the time they make their purchase 
decision. 
The key to assessing the impact of quality improvement efforts on profitability lies 
in understanding their influence on customer perceptions and patronage. This is 
particularly important when quality efforts deal with intangible aspects of services 
(Rust, Zahorik, & Keiningham, 1995). It is therefore necessary to connect internal 
quality metrics to customer behavior. Figure 1, adapted from Bitran and Lojo 
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(1993), depicts the connection between operational processes, behavioral 
intentions, and profitability. Rust et al. (1995) point out that quality improvements 
affect profits directly through a reduction in costs or indirectly through an increase 
in revenue. In the case of airline operations management, the cost reductions 
(represented in Figure 1 by the arrow connecting Operational Processes to 
Profitability) are well known and can be readily quantified, reflecting the significant 
advances operations managers have made in understanding the Internal 
Environment. The indirect revenue effects are more difficult to quantify and are 
typically left out or over-simplified in optimization models. 
 
Figure 1. Framework connecting operational processes, behavioral intentions, and 
profitability 
2. Key issues examined 
Connecting perceived delays to behavioural intentions 
Much attention has been paid to the effects of delays on customers (see Bitran, 
Ferrer & Rocha e Oliveira, 2008). There is general consensus in the literature that 
delays have a detrimental effect on customers’ service evaluations and behavioral 
intentions. We therefore predict that perceived delays will have a negative impact 
on behavioral intentions. 
Connecting perceived safety to behavioural intentions 
Safety is an antecedent of perceived safety, and profitability is a consequence of 
behavioral intentions. Thus, a positive relationship between safety and profitability 
is consistent with the notion that perceived safety favorably impacts behavioral 
intentions.  
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(2), 86-100 
89 
 
Fatal crashes are one of the few safety-related events that are readily apparent to 
customers and significantly affect their perceptions of an airline's safety. The media 
are particularly fascinated by deaths resulting from plane crashes (Trevison, 2000). 
Moreover, news reports of airline crashes are typically vivid - attracting and holding 
attention and exciting the imagination (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), thereby producing a 
strong effect on customer perceptions and judgments (McGill & Anand, 1989). We 
thus conclude that fatal crashes are very likely to exert a negative effect on 
customers' perceptions of an airline’s safety, whereas other accidents and incidents 
in general may not be apparent to customers and hence may not affect them. 
Rose (1992) suggests that when a fatal crash occurs, both perceived safety and the 
airline's revenues decrease. Since revenues are a direct consequence of the 
customers' behavioral intentions (see Figure 1) we posit that the adverse effect on 
revenues of a decline in perceived safety is mediated through behavioral intentions. 
Therefore, we expect that perceived safety will have a positive impact on behavioral 
intentions. 
Connecting perceived delays to perceived safety 
Situations involving attributes that customers must assess with missing or 
incomplete information have been studied extensively in the psychology literature. 
Indirect transitive inference provides a link between delays and safety: if a delay is 
related to operational practices and operational practices are related to safety (as in 
the internal environment in Figure 1), then the delay is related to safety (c.f. 
Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1994). In order to make sense of the relations between 
predictions, actions, and outcomes, customers must have an underlying causal 
model (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1982). One reasonable causal model is that delays and 
safety failures are both caused by faulty operational processes. Thus, from the 
customer’s perspective, an airline with faulty operational processes is more likely to 
have fatal crashes and a higher number of incidents resulting in delays.  
In summary, customers will make inferences about safety through observable 
attributes that are perceived to be correlated to safety. A causal sequence in which 
delays and safety are linked through a common cause -- operational practices -- 
provides the basis for such a correlation. We thus expect perceived delays to have 
a negative impact on perceived safety. 
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3. Methodology 
We collaborated with a major international airline (Airline hereafter) that routinely 
administers a customer satisfaction questionnaire to randomly selected customers 
on each flight. We added items to this questionnaire to measure the constructs 
necessary to examine the links among perceived delays, perceived safety and 
behavioral intentions (the questionnaire items are in the Appendix). 
The data were collected over a period of two months in mid-2006. The Airline's 
flight attendants requested four randomly selected customers in each flight to fill 
out the customer satisfaction survey. We obtained completed surveys from 
797 customers, 255 of whom indicated that their flights were delayed, while the 
remaining 542 indicated that their flights departed on time. Table 1 summarizes 
key demographic information about the sample, which closely resembles the overall 
demographic profile of the airline's customers; Table 2 provides Pearson bivariate 
correlations between the study's variables. 
Gender 63% male, 37% female 
Age Average: 41.15 years old 
Residence 55.6% live in the Airline's home country 
Table 1. Demographics 
 
Table 2. Pearson bivariate correlations between variables. There is no correlation 
between "DELAY" and the "CONTROL" variables because the "control" questions 
were only answered by the passengers whose flights were delayed 
 
 
 
 
 
 D S BI1 BI2 BI3 BI4 BI5 C1 C2 T1 
DELAY 1          
           SAFETY -.119*** 1         
           BI1 -.046 .408*** 1        
BI2 -.061* .467*** .853*** 1       
BI3 -.071* .455*** .824*** .887** 1      
BI4 -.063* .454*** .615*** .702** .700*** 1     
BI5 -.084** .498*** .658*** .743** .704*** .772*** 1    
           CONTROL1 n.a. -.139** -.271*** -.225** -.274*** -.156** -.150** 1   
CONTROL2 n.a. .173* .319*** .304** .305*** .252*** .272*** -.521*** 1  
           TANGIBLES1 -.096*** .588*** .432*** .428** .397*** .342*** .379*** -.114 .235*** 1 
TANGIBLES2 -.090** .487*** .433*** .434** .431*** .384*** .389*** -.047 .225*** .629*** 
*** 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10% 
 
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(2), 86-100 
91 
 
4. Results 
Main results: Perceived safety mediates the impact of perceived delay on 
behavioural intentions 
The discussion in previous sections suggests a mediation model linking perceived 
delays, perceived safety, and behavioral intentions (see Figure 2). Behavioral 
Intentions were measured using the five items listed in the Appendix, which were 
combined into a single scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.93). 
 
Figure 2. Perceived safety mediates the impact of perceived delay on behavioral 
intentions 
We tested this model by following Baron and Kenny's (1986) three-step procedure 
for detecting mediation effects. 
We first regressed the mediator on the independent variable – eq (1) – to check if 
the latter affects the former (i.e., coefficient D in eq (1) is significant): 
SAFETY= +DDELAY
 (1) 
Next, we regressed the dependent variable on the independent variable – eq (2) – 
to check if the latter affects the former (i.e., coefficient D in eq (2) is significant): 
BEHAVIOR=O +DDELAY
 
(2) 
Finally, we regressed the dependent variable on both the independent variable and 
the mediator – eq (3) – to verify that the mediator affects dependent variable (i.e., 
coefficient S is significant), and that the effect of the independent variable 
decreases (i.e., S in eq (3) is less than D in eq (2)): 
 
 BEHAVIOR= +DDELAY+SSAFETY
 
(3) 
(-)
Perceived
Safety
Perceived
Delay
Behavioral
Intentions
(-) (+)
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The results from estimating regression equations (1), (2), and (3) are summarized 
in Table 3. All coefficients except the DELAY coefficient in eq (3) are significant at 
the 0.05 level. Thus, Baron and Kenny's (1986) three conditions for mediation are 
satisfied. Moreover, SAFETY fully mediates the effect of DELAY on BEHAVIOR since 
the D coefficient in eq (3) is not significant. We further verified the indirect effect 
of delays on behavioral intentions via perceived safety through the Sobel test 
(Sobel, 1982), which was significant at the 0.001 level. 
Regression Eq Safety-Delay 
 Coefficient 
(unstandardized) 
Std. Error 
Constant 4.506*** 0.035 
Delay -0.202*** 0.062 
Regression Eq Behavior-Delay   
Constant 21.061*** 0.189 
Delay -0.652** 0.331 
Regression Eq Behavior-Delay-Safety   
Constant 8.988*** 0.777 
Delay -0.119 0.288 
Safety 2.684*** 0.169 
*** 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10% 
Table 3. Results of regressions used to test mediation model 
Complementary results: Further support for the proposed causal sequence 
Perceived safety is negatively correlated with perceptions of the service provider’s 
control over the delay 
If our theory outlined above and summarized in Figure 2 is correct, then we would 
expect customers who assume that a delay has occurred because the airline 
mismanaged an operational process (i.e., the airline could have done something to 
avoid or reduce the delay but did not) to have lower perception of the airline’s 
safety. On the other hand, we would expect customers who assume that there was 
nothing that the airline could have done about the delay to infer that the airline is 
capable of managing all operational processes successfully and thus their 
perception of the airline’s safety should increase. We measured these two aspects 
of perceived control through two separate items (see Appendix) that had a 
significant correlation of -0.521 between them (Cronbach's alpha was 0.68). 
The correlations between perceived safety and the CONTROL variables (presented 
in Table 2) support this explanation. High ratings on the CONTROL1 item (Airline 
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could have done something to shorten the delay) refer to a low assessment of the 
airline's operational capabilities, so the significant negative correlation observed 
(-0.139, significant at the 5% level) supports our theory. Likewise, low ratings on 
the CONTROL2 item (There was nothing Airline could have done to prevent the 
delay) reflect inferences about operational incompetence, so the positive correlation 
(0.173, significant at the 1% level) obtained also offers support for our theory. It 
therefore seems important to keep customers informed about the causes of delays 
and to reassure them that the delays are unrelated to safety, tactfully making sure 
that they understand that the causes of the delay in no way related to operational 
practices that might compromise their safety. 
Perceived safety mediates the impact of tangibles on behavioral intentions 
Customers’ use of delays as a cue in making inferences about safety (as supported 
by our mediation-analysis results reported in Section 4), which they are unable to 
observe directly, suggests that they are likely to use additional cues to make safety 
inferences. One likely source of such cues is the tangible aspects of the service 
encounter (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1985). Tangibles relate to the 
appearance of physical facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication 
materials. 
Tangibles are more than just cues about safety; they are also intrinsically important 
(e.g., customers prefer a clean seat over a dirty seat) and therefore directly affect 
customers’ service-quality perceptions and the behavioral intentions that follow 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985). Figure 3 presents a mediation model depicting the 
proposed relationships among tangibles, perceived safety and behavioral intentions. 
 
Figure 3. Perceived safety mediates the impact of tangibles on behavioral intentions 
Customer ratings on the two questionnaire items relating to tangibles are strongly 
correlated with perceived safety (see Table 2), supporting the notion that 
customers look for safety cues because of their inability to directly observe safety. 
The strength of these correlations is noteworthy, especially relative to that of the 
(+)
Perceived
Safety
Tangibles
Behavioral
Intentions
(+) (+)
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control-perceived safety correlations. The distributions in Figure 4 offer further 
evidence that customers are likely to use visual attractiveness as another proxy for 
safety—the changes in the distributions of perceived safety as one moves from left 
to right (i.e., from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on visual attractiveness) 
is dramatic. 
 
Figure 4. Frequency distributions of SAFETY ratings for various levels of visual 
attractiveness (TANGIBLES2) 
To verify the proposed mediation model in Figure 3, we used Baron and Kenny's 
(1986) procedure and estimated the following equations:  
SAFETY=O+TANGIBLES 
BEHAVIOR==O+TANGIBLES 
BEHAVIOR=O+DTANGIBLES+SSAFETY 
Regression Eq Safety-Tangibles  
 Coefficient 
(unstandardized) 
Std. Error 
Constant 2.332*** 0.109 
Tangibles1 0.506*** 0.025 
Regression Eq Behavior-Tangibles    
Constant 12.276*** 0.651 
Tangibles1 2.049*** 0.153 
Regression Eq Behavior-Tangibles-Safety    
Constant 7.750*** 0.765 
Tangibles1 1.034*** 0.179 
Safety 1.977*** 0.205 
 *** 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10% 
Table 4. Results when the independent variable is modernity of equipment 
Visually Attractive:
“Strongly Disagree”
50%
100%
25%
75%
Visually Attractive :
“Disagree”
Visually Attractive :
“Indifferent”
Visually Attractive :
“Agree”
Visually Attractive :
“Strongly Agree”
SD SA
“I feel safe”
SD SA
“I feel safe”
SD SA
“I feel safe”
SD SA
“I feel safe”
SD SA
“I feel safe”
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TANGIBLES1 and TANGIBLES2 measure modernity of equipment and visual 
attractiveness, respectively. The overlapping variance (i.e., squared correlation) 
between the two was only 39% (Cronbach's alpha= 0.78). Therefore, we conducted 
the mediation analyses separately for each variable. Table 4 and Table 5 
summarize the results for TANGIBLES1 and TANGIBLES2, respectively. 
Regression Eq Safety-Tangibles  
 Coefficient 
(unstandardized) 
Std. Error 
Constant 2.813*** 0.109 
Tangibles2 0.402*** 0.026 
Regression Eq Behavior-Tangibles    
Constant 12.647*** 0.596 
Tangibles2 2.024*** 0.143 
Regression Eq Behavior-Tangibles-Safety    
Constant 7.170*** 0.754 
Tangibles2 1.261*** 0.152 
Safety 1.934*** 0.184 
 *** 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10% 
Table 5. Results when the independent variable is visual attractiveness 
The results in both tables, showing all coefficients as being highly significant, 
strongly support the mediation model. Comparison of the TANGIBLES coefficient in 
the Behavior-Tangibles equation and the Behavior-Tangibles-Safety equation 
(2.049 vs. 1.034 for TANGIBLES1 and 2.024 vs. 1.261 for TANGIBLES2) shows that 
the direct effect of tangibles on behavioral intentions declines (though it is still 
significant) when perceived safety is included as a mediator. This suggests a 
significant partial mediation effect (in both cases the Sobel test was significant at 
0.0001 level). 
In summary, the findings from our analyses examining the mediating role of 
perceived safety on the impact of both perceived delays and tangibles on behavioral 
intentions suggest that customers use observable attributes to make inferences 
about the soundness of internal operational processes that could affect passenger 
safety. 
5. Conclusion 
Perceived safety fully mediates the impact of perceived delay on behavioral 
intentions (and partially mediates the impact of other observable attributes such as 
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tangibles). The general lack of publicly available information about airlines’ safety 
records leads customers to look for other “safety cues” during their air travel. 
Airline companies would do well to pay particular attention to proactively managing 
such cues so as to reassure customers and strengthen their loyalty. For instance, 
proactive communications with customers can help avoid misunderstandings about 
reasons for delays, and providing a pleasant environment during the flight can also 
enhance customers’ trust in the airline.  
Observable cues other than delays and the tangibles investigated in the present 
study may also influence customers’ safety perceptions (e.g., the appearance, 
demeanor and behavior of airline personnel who interact with customers). 
Investigating the nature and magnitude of the impact of all such cues - and 
managing those cues accordingly - are also fruitful avenues to pursue for both 
researchers and managers.  
One of our main objectives in this project was to stimulate further work in 
operations management that takes into account the customers' perspective. It is 
our hope that our results will provide new insights to researchers designing 
optimization models for service organizations. 
One important area of further research is the coordination of various safety cues. 
The present paper examined the effect of several cues, but was by no means 
exhaustive. There are many more tangibles that may -- or may not -- be serving as 
cues used by customers to make inferences about safety. Another potentially 
important source of safety cues that was not examined in this paper is the 
employees' attitudes towards safety. More work needs to be done to investigate the 
extent to which these perceptions are transferred on to customers and the steps 
that can be taken to create a culture of safety to ensure that whatever cues are 
being transmitted are positive. 
Another avenue for further research concerns the design of service encounters and 
customer interfaces. Our study showed that delays can be interpreted as a cue that 
can lead to inferences about unobservable attributes. As such, the management of 
delays should be analyzed in the context simultaneously managing multiple cues in 
order to achieve a given objective. Previous research in this area has found that the 
various cues can interact with each other, so it is particularly critical for managers 
to understand the joint effect on customers resulting from the combination of 
delays with the various other cues present in the service interface.  
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(2), 86-100 
97 
 
This paper also brings to the surface a number of relevant research questions from 
the behavioral perspective. First, there is the opportunity for further work 
connecting internal and external perceptions of safety. It would be useful, for 
example, to study several airlines to analyze the extent to which various internal 
safety metrics correlate with the customers' safety perceptions. Second, more 
research is needed to examine the role of affect and mood in perceptions of safety. 
It is well-established in the psychology literature that mood significantly affects 
estimates of risk and undesirable events and flight delays have been shown to 
affects customers' emotions. Thus, it is possible, for example, that uncertainty and 
anger mediate the impact of delays on perceived safety. A deeper understanding of 
these issues would permit the development of more effective perceptions 
management techniques. 
Appendix: Questionnaire items 
To measure perceptions of delay, we included the question below, which was 
answered on a binary (yes/no) scale: 
  DELAY: Did your flight depart on time? 
This item was dummy-coded so that if the answer was yes DELAY=0 and if the 
answer was no DELAY=1, 
To measure perceived safety, we added the following question: 
  SAFETY: I feel safe flying with Airline 
Responses to this item were on a 5-point scale, with extreme points labeled as 
strongly disagree and strongly agree. 
Behavioral Intentions were measured with a five-item scale developed by Zeithaml 
et al. (1996). Responses to the five BI items were on a 5-point scale with the 
anchors labeled as very unlikely and very likely. 
  BI1: Say positive things about Airline to other people 
  BI2: Recommend Airline to someone who seeks your advice 
  BI3: Encourage friends and relatives to do business with Airline 
  BI4: Consider Airline your first choice for an airline 
  BI5: Do more business with Airline in the next few years 
Next, we included two questions about control based on the studies of Folkes et al. 
(1987) and Taylor (1994). 
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 CONTROL1: Airline could have done something to shorten the delay 
 CONTROL2: There was nothing Airline could have done to prevent the delay 
The CONTROL items were answered on a 5-point scale with anchors strongly 
disagree and strongly agree. 
We included two items about the tangibles dimension of service quality from the 
SERVQUAL scale (Parasuraman et al. 1988): 
  TANGIBLES1: Airline has modern equipment 
  TANGIBLES2: Airline's airplanes are visually attractive 
Both TANGIBLES items were answered on a 5-point scale with anchors labeled 
strongly disagree and strongly agree. 
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